Suchergebnisse

This study compares the performance of banks that are part of a financial holding company (FHC banks) with that of banks that are not (independent banks) using Taiwan data from 2002:Q1 to 2006:Q2. The comparisons are based on 14 performance ratios resulting from the concept of CAMEL (which is an acronym for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management efficiency, Earnings ability, and Liquidity sufficiency). To ensure that becoming part of an FHC is a random process, we used four matching methods to select the controlled banks so that the characteristic variables of banks in the two groups are statistically indifferent. By using the data before matching, it was found that FHC banks significantly defeat independent banks, regardless of their performance ratios. Conversely, when the sample was used after the matching, the results changed dramatically. Although FHC banks still beat the independent banks in terms of capital adequacy, asset quality, and liquidity sufficiency, FHC banks and independent banks are found to have equal profitability and management efficiency. Earlier studies that do not consider the endogeneity problem tend to overestimate the joining effect.(JELC21, G21)

AbstractThis study examines the effects of connections and economic performance on the promotion of Chinese city mayors. Our study differs from the published literature in four respects. First, this study covers a comprehensive data set, including 1,422 mayors from 284 prefecture‐level cities. The use of a large data set helps resolve mixed results of past studies. Second, we use a broader range of top leaders. Third, we apply a more comprehensive definition of connections than earlier studies. Finally, we examine the effects of the policy shift of the 11th 5‐year plan on promotion of mayors. Our results reveal that the performance of a city mayor assisted his/her promotion to party secretary before 2006 but not afterwards. However, a mayor's connection with five types of top leaders is helpful. Among the four types of connection, colleagueship is the most effective in expediting the promotion of mayors. Graduating from the same university and department is also helpful but to a lesser extent. Township connection is not useful.

This paper studies the impacts of corporate governance on earnings management. We use firm‐level governance data, taken from Credit Lyonnais Security Asia (CLSA), of nine Asian countries, in addition to the country‐level governance data used in past studies. Our conclusion is as follows. First, firms with good corporate governance tend to conduct less earnings management. Second, there is a size effect for earnings smoothing, that is, large size firms are prone to conduct earnings smoothing, but good corporate governance can mitigate the effect on average. Third, there is a turning point for leverage effect, i.e. when the governance index is large, leverage effect exists, otherwise reverse leverage effect exists. It shows that a highly leveraged firm with poor governance is prone to be scrutinised closely and thus finds it harder to fool the market by manipulating earnings. Fourth, firms with higher growth (lower earnings yield) are prone to engage in earnings smoothing and earnings aggressiveness, but good corporate governance can mitigate the effect. Finally, firms in stronger anti‐director rights countries tend to exhibit stronger earnings smoothing. This counter‐intuitive result is different from Leuz et al. (2003).